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In this paper we analyze the clustering phenomenon of underpricing in initial public of-
ferings (IPOs), where ﬁrms in a particular industry choose to issue their new shares at the
same time and at great discounts. The industry consists of many ﬁrms that have private in-
formation about their own qualities (high or low) and that must raise external capital ﬁrst
before production. In the product market, ﬁrms compete through quality ladders, where each
high-quality ﬁrm monopolizes the production of a particular variety of product. We show that
self-fulﬁlling multiple equilibria arise. In one, no ﬁrm underprices the IPO. In the other, all
high-quality ﬁrms underprice their IPOs, resulting in clustering. Moreover, the clustering is
more likely to occur in economic upturns than in downturns, and in an easy credit market
than in a tight market.
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In this paper we model the phenomenon that large price gains in new shares cluster sporadically
in particular industries. We show that aggregate demand uncertainty in the industry’s product
market, together with private information about individual ﬁrms’ qualities, can induce a large
number of rational ﬁrms to issue their new shares at the same time and at great discounts,
resulting in the clustering of subsequent price gains.
Our analysis is motivated by the Internet “craze” around 1999, in which many Internet ﬁrms
issued new shares to the public, through the initial public oﬀering ( o rI P Of o rs h o r t ) . T h o s e
shares experienced large price gains immediately after the IPOs, sometimes by several times as
the issuing price, suggesting that the ﬁrms greatly underpriced their new shares. The clustering of
such price gains in Internet IPOs contrasted sharply with the lackluster performance of concurrent
IPOs in other industries.1 It was also short-lived, as the number of underpriced Internet IPOs
and the magnitude of underpricing both diminished in 2000. Why do rational ﬁrms cluster to
underprice their IPOs? Why does such clustering occur in particular industries?
These questions should be interesting to macroeconomists, as well as to ﬁnance specialists.
First, macroeconomists often view capital market imperfections as an important reason why
monetary policies can aﬀect real activities. By identifying the imperfections that generate the
discrepancy between oﬀer prices and market prices of new shares, we may shed light on how
macroeconomic policies might stimulate the growth of new industries. Second, the ﬁnance lit-
erature, to our knowledge, has not yet provided a theoretical model to demonstrate that IPO
underpricing can cluster in a market equilibrium. Instead, it focuses on the decisions of a single
ﬁrm or underwriter (see the references later). To understand how clustering can be consistent
with a market equilibrium, one must go beyond individual ﬁrms’ behavior, and perhaps beyond
the equity market as well. This task has a macroeconomic ﬂavor.
1In fact, there was an increase in cancellations and withdraws from the IPO market by non-Internet ﬁrms in
1999. As the chief executive of a large dry pet food company complained, “If you look at the IPO market, there’s
large-capitalization activity and dot.com activity, but little else. I feel sorry for small-cap companies that are
nondot.com, and which need to complete their deals.” (Prial 1999)
1We explore the interaction between the IPO market and the product market for a new in-
dustry that faces an uncertain aggregate demand for its products. The expectations of such
demand increase with the industry’s publicity, which we assume to be an increasing function
of the industry-wide average price gains in IPOs. The new industry comprises of many ﬁrms,
a fraction of which produce high-quality varieties of goods (or services) and others low-quality
products. In order to produce, a ﬁrm must raise external capital ﬁrst, either through IPO in the
equity market or through other costly methods. At this stage, whether a ﬁrm is a high-quality
or low-quality ﬁrm is private information. After obtaining external capital, ﬁrms compete in the
goods market with quality ladders and monopolistic competition, as modelled in Grossman and
Helpman (1991). That is, each high-quality ﬁrm uses its quality advantage to monopolize the
production of a particular variety, while low-quality ﬁrms competitively produce those varieties
whose most recent technologies have already been imitated. These varieties are complementary
with each other in consumers’ preferences, and so each individual ﬁrm’s expected earnings in-
crease with the aggregate demand for the industry’s products. With the assumption that such
aggregate demand increases with the industry’s publicity, individual ﬁrms’ expected earnings
increase with the industry’s publicity as well.
What matters for the ﬁrms’ decisions in the IPO market, however, is the diﬀerential beneﬁti n
expected earnings that the industry’s publicity generates to a high-quality ﬁrm, relative to a low-
quality ﬁrm. We show that this diﬀerential beneﬁt is positive and increases with the industry’s
publicity. This diﬀerential beneﬁt creates the desire for high-quality ﬁrms to separate themselves
from low-quality ﬁrms, by signalling quality in the IPO market. At the same time, the diﬀerential
beneﬁt increases the diﬃculty of signalling, because it increases low-quality ﬁrms’ temptation to
masquerade as high-quality ﬁrms. To signal successfully, high-quality ﬁrms may take very costly
actions such as IPO underpricing. Whether they will do so depends on their expectations of the
industry’s publicity.
There are two self-fulﬁlling market equilibria, in which high-quality ﬁrms successfully separate
2themselves from low-quality ﬁrms.2 In one, all high-quality ﬁrms underprice their IPOs and, in the
other, no ﬁrm underprices the IPO. In the underpricing equilibrium, ﬁrms expect the industry’s
publicity to be high. Such expectations create a large diﬀerence in expected earnings between a
high-quality and low-quality ﬁrm, which increases the temptation for low-quality ﬁrms to mimick
high-quality ﬁrms in the IPO market. To signal successfully, high-quality ﬁrms underprice their
IPOs. In turn, the clustering of subsequent gains in share prices increases the industry’s publicity,
thus fulﬁlling the expectations that the aggregate demand for the industry’s products will be high.
In the no-underpricing equilibrium, in contrast, the industry’s publicity is expected to be low,
and so the diﬀerence in expected earnings between a high-quality and low-quality ﬁrm will be
low. There is no need to underprice IPO in this case; instead, high-quality ﬁrms signal quality
by reducing the number of shares issued in IPO. In turn, the absence of large price gains in the
IPOs fulﬁlls the expectations that the industry’s publicity will be low.
The clustering generates large underpricing for each high-quality ﬁrm. To emphasize this
feature, we deliberately restrict the intrinsic diﬀerence between a high-quality and low-quality
ﬁrm to be small, so that underpricing would not occur if there were no interactions among the
ﬁrms. Even with this restriction, the clustering induces high-quality ﬁrms to underprice their
IPOs by 100% in one version of our model!
Let us clarify the assumption that expected aggregate demand for the industry’s products is
an increasing function of the average magnitude of IPO underpricing in the industry. First, this
assumption is reasonable for a very new industry, like the Internet industry, whose products are
quite diﬀerent from those oﬀered by traditional businesses. Because there is little guidance to
predicting the product demand for such an industry, spectacular price gains in new shares in the
industry can create publicity for the industry and increase consumer awareness of the industry,
thus beneﬁting the industry as a whole. Second, the assumption itself does not generate the result
that underpriced IPOs cluster. On the contrary, it alone reduces ﬁrms’ incentive to underprice.
2All equilibria we focus on in this paper are separating equilibria that are reﬁned by the intuitive criterion of Cho
and Kreps (1987). For each value of expected earnings, there is a unique separating equilibrium in the signalling
game, but there are multiple values of expected earnings that are consistent with rational expectations.
3Because individual ﬁrms take the industry’s publicity as an externality, they would free-ride on
the externality. So, in usual circumstances, no ﬁrm would choose to underprice its IPO.
Our model overcomes the free-rider problem because of the product market characteristics
and the private information. The product market equilibrium generates the outcome that the
diﬀerence in expected earnings between a high-quality and low-quality ﬁrm increases with the
aggregate demand in the industry. With private information, a high-quality ﬁrm can capture this
diﬀerential beneﬁto n l yi fi tc a nc o n v i n c et h em a r k e tt h a ti ti sah i g h - q u a l i t yﬁrm. This entails
costly signalling actions in the IPO market, such as underpricing.
Our paper belongs broadly to the literature of self-fulﬁlling, multiple equilibria (e.g., Diamond
and Dybvig, 1983), but the focus on IPO is speciﬁc. In addition, the actions clustered in the
equilibrium here are the attempts to signal quality. Such asymmetric information or signalling
is not important for multiple equilibria in the Diamond-Dybvig model. Private information is
important in the herding models (e.g., Banerjee 1992 and Bikhchandani et al. 1992), but the role
is quite diﬀerent from that in our model. There, herding occurs as agents choose to ignore, rather
than signal, their private information.
The main contribution of our paper to the IPO literature is that we analyze why underpriced
IPOs can cluster in equilibrium. Except for empirical documentations of clustering (e.g., Ritter
1984), the literature does not provide a theoretical model for clustering, because it focuses on
an individual ﬁrm’s or underwriter’s underpricing decisions.3 For example, Allen and Faulhaber
(1989), Welch (1989), and Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and Tambanis and Bernhardt (1999)
use the signalling model to examine IPO underpricing. Rock (1986) emphasizes information
asymmetry in a diﬀerent way, arguing that the winner’s curse forces a ﬁrm to underprice IPO
in order to attract uninformed investors. Others attribute underpricing to underwriters who try
to build good reputations through the price gains (e.g., Beatty and Ritter 1986, and Benveniste
and Spindt 1989), to a ﬁrm’s concern for liquidity in the secondary market (e.g., Mauer and Sen-
3See Michaely and Shaw (1994) for an extensive list of references and empirical works. Loughran and Ritter
(2000) provide some recent references.
4bet 1992), or to behaviors that are not Bayesian rational (Loughran and Ritter 2000). Another
related contribution of our analysis is that we link the IPO market equilibrium to the equilib-
rium in the industry’s product market. The quality-ladder framework generates product demand
complementarity, which makes it rational for ﬁrms to cluster their actions.
We use a signalling model to describe the IPO decisions and abstract from the institutional
features like underwriters.4 When a ﬁrm underprices IPO, it transfers a part of its value to in-
vestors free of charge. One may ask why ﬁrms choose this speciﬁc way to signal, rather than other
“money-burning” actions such as advertisement. One reason is that other money-burning actions
entail current resources which a new ﬁrm may not have. In contrast, signalling by underpricing
IPO entails only expected future earnings. In comparison with advertisement, speciﬁcally, IPO
underpricing is superior for additional reasons. First, when the entire industry is new, advertise-
ment may not be as eﬀective as the hard evidence of IPO price gains. Second, advertisement
must be monitored in order to be credible, while IPO price gains are publicly observed.5
2. The Model
2.1. Industry Uncertainty and Private Information
As argued in the introduction, a new industry like the Internet industry faces aggregate uncer-
tainty in the product demand, and investors’ expectations on the industry are susceptible to the
industry’s IPO performance. To capture this idea, let Y be consumers’ aggregate expenditure on
the industry’s products and Da the industry-wide average price gain in new shares immediately
4Underwriters’ concern for reputation may be a good explanation for isolated cases of underpricing, but not
for the clustering of underpricing. When underpriced IPOs cluster, price gains are prevalent across underwriters,
concentrated in a particular industry, and short-lived. In contrast, underwriters who are motivated by reputation
should underprice IPOs in all industries, rather than a particular industry, and for a long period of time (since
reputation needs time to build), rather than for a short period of time like 1999.
5Signalling models have been criticized on the basis that post-IPO earnings do not seem to have much ex-
planatory power for the underpricing magnitude (see Michaely and Shaw, 1994). For two reasons we view this
as inconclusive evidence against the signalling model. First, the signalling model predicts that the magnitude of
underpricing depends positively only on the part of future earnings that is private information prior to IPO. Most
of the empirical tests do not distinguish this part of future earnings from the part that is publicly expected prior to
IPO. Second, because post-IPO performances depend on post-IPO investment strategies that may not be foreseen
a tt h et i m eo fI P O ,s u c hp e r f o r m a n c e sm a yn o tb eg o o di n d i c a t o r so ft h eﬁrms’ conditional expected earnings at
the time of IPO. Most of the empirical tests do not control for such a diversity in post-IPO investment strategies.
5after IPO. Expected aggregate demand for the industry’s products is as follows:
E(Y |Da)=Y0 + ρaDa, ρa > 0. (2.1)
There are two justiﬁcations for ρa > 0. First, investors may spend some of the price gains from
Internet IPOs on Internet goods. Second, the clustering of large price gains in new shares creates
publicity for the industry and, as consumers become more aware of the industry, they may switch
some expenditure from traditional goods to the Internet goods. For example, Internet ﬁrms that
sell books, auction goods, or provide market information on Internet compete against businesses
that organize such activities in traditional ways. If these ﬁrms’ IPOs have large price gains, the
publicity may induce customers to switch from traditional ﬁrms to these new ﬁrms, e.g., switching
from buying books in neighborhood bookstores to Internet book-selling ﬁrms.
The assumption (2.1) is important to our results in the sense that it links the industry’s
aggregate IPO performance and the aggregate demand in the product market. It would be
erroneous, however, to think that we are assuming the result of clustering by imposing this
assumption. As explained in the introduction, the assumption (2.1) itself would generate the
free-rider problem and lead to the opposite result that no ﬁrm would choose to underprice the
IPO. We will establish this result formally in Proposition 2.2 later.
The industry produces a continuum of varieties of goods and the ﬁrms are on two quality
ladders. Let i ∈ [0,1] be the index of varieties and α ∈ (0,1) the fraction of high-quality ﬁrms
in the industry. Each variety in the sub-interval [α,1] is produced by low-quality ﬁrms, whose
technology can be easily imitated, and so there is perfect competition for the production of
such varieties. In contrast, each variety in the sub-interval [0,α) is produced by a high-quality
ﬁrm, which uses its advanced technology to drive out competition. Delaying the description of
“quality” to the next subsection, we use x = xH > 1 to indicate high-quality and x = xL =1
low-quality. To produce, a ﬁrm must have an amount of capital k0 > 1, which is the same for all
ﬁrms. However, a ﬁrm is endowed with only (k0 −1) amount of capital and hence must raise one
unit of external capital, through initial public oﬀering and/or alternative ﬁnancing methods.
6At the time of raising external capital, a ﬁrm’s quality is private information. The market
belief about each ﬁrm prior to IPOs coincides with the population statistics of ﬁrms, i.e., the
ﬁrm is of high-quality with probability α and of a low-quality with probability 1−α.I nt h eI P O
market, a ﬁrm chooses the oﬀer price s and the number of shares f to be oﬀered. Normalize the
total number of a ﬁrm’s shares to 1, so that f ∈ (0,1]. The ﬁrm’s original owners keep 1 − f
shares. The market price of shares is p. The gain to IPO investors is d ≡ p−s per share. The ﬁrm
underprices IPO if d>0. The IPO revenue is q ≡ sf.I fq<1, the ﬁrm ﬁnances the remainder




(1 − q), where b>0 is a constant. Thus, for each unit of alternative funds,
the additional expected cost is bx−1, which is decreasing in the ﬁrm’s quality.6
The sequence of actions is as follows. First, ﬁr m sg ot ot h eI P Om a r k e tt oi s s u es h a r e s ,a n d
all ﬁrms do so at the same time (see Section 5 for sequential decisions). Second, if a ﬁrm’s IPO
revenue falls short of the required amount (1 unit), the ﬁrm seeks alternative ﬁnancing. Third,
ﬁrms combine capital with labor to produce and compete in the product market. After paying
the labor cost, each ﬁrm repays the alternative funds ﬁrst and then shareholders.
We want to clarify a few points about the alternative ﬁnancing methods. First, by assuming
that the expected cost of alternative funds is a decreasing function of the ﬁrm’s quality, we do
not mean that alternative ﬁnanciers know the ﬁrm’s quality perfectly. Rather, the ﬁnanciers’
knowledge of the ﬁrm is imperfect and positively correlated with the ﬁrm’s true quality. For
example, the ﬁnanciers may screen the ﬁrm and determine the loan rate according to the screening
outcome. If the screening technology yields a noisy signal that is positively correlated with the
ﬁrm’s quality, then the expected cost of the funds is a decreasing function of the ﬁrm’s true
quality, although the ﬁnanciers do not know the ﬁrm’s quality. Second, it is not necessary (but
convenient) to assume that ﬁrms go to the IPO market ﬁrst and then to alternative ﬁnanciers.
I f ,i n s t e a d ,aﬁrm seeks alternative funds ﬁrst, then the IPO investors can infer the ﬁnanciers’
6The linear cost function keeps the analysis simple, but all analytical results in this paper hold for a more
general cost function (1 + b/x)C(1 − q)t h a ts a t i s ﬁes C(0) = 0, C
0(0) ≥ 1a n dC
00 > 0.
7screening outcome by observing the cost of the ﬁrm’s alternative funds. This alleviates, but
does not solve, the asymmetric information problem in the IPO market, because the alternative
ﬁnanciers’ screening outcome is not a perfect indicator of the ﬁrm’s true quality. With positive
probability a high-quality ﬁrm can be wrongly labeled as low-quality by the alternative ﬁnanciers,
in which case the ﬁrm may still ﬁnd it useful to signal its true quality through the IPO actions.7
2 . 2 .P r o d u c tM a r k e ta n dF i r m s ’E a r n i n g s
Because a ﬁrm’s IPO decision depends on the expectations of the ﬁrm’s earnings, we analyze
the equilibrium in the product market ﬁrst. Suppose that high-quality ﬁrms have successfully
separated themselves through the IPO activities, an outcome we will establish later. Then, a
ﬁrm’s quality is public information in the product market. The capital cost, which has been
determined endogenously in the IPO market, is denoted kL for a low-quality ﬁrm and kH for a
high-quality ﬁrm. Note that kj ≥ k0 > 1, for j = H,L.
In the product market, a high-quality ﬁrm is the technological leader in the production of a
particular variety. We capture this technological advantage by assuming that a high-quality ﬁrm
needs less labor to produce than a low-quality ﬁrm (see Grossman and Helpman 1991). The labor
input required to produce c(i) units of variety i is
l = c(i)/c0 if i ∈ [0,α), and l = c(i)/(βc0)i fi ∈ [α,1],
where 0 < β < 1a n dc0 > 0. Thus, each variety in [0,α) is produced by a high-quality ﬁrm and
each variety in [α,1] by a low-quality ﬁrm. A high-quality producer of a variety has a technological
advantage for that variety (of a factor 1/β) over its potential low-quality imitators.







7Empirical evidence seems to support this argument. For example, James and Wier (1990) and Slovin and
Young (1990) ﬁnd that IPOs of ﬁrms with previously established borrowing relationships can still experience IPO
underpricing, although they may underprice by less than other IPOs.
8where c(i) is the amount of consumption of variety i.L e tπ(i) be the price of variety i,m e a s u r e d










Solving this problem, we have the following demand curve for variety i:
π(i)=Y/c(i), for all i ∈ [0,1].
Facing the demand curve, a ﬁrm maximizes net proﬁt. Let lj be the labor input of a type-j
ﬁrm, j = H,L, and normalize the wage rate to 1.8 At y p e - j ﬁrm’s net proﬁti sπ(i)c(i)−lj −kj.
Because the technology to produce a low-quality variety can be readily imitated, net proﬁti s
zero for such a ﬁrm. In contrast, a high-quality ﬁrm monopolizes the production of a particular
variety, by setting the price to be just low enough to prevent low-quality imitators from entering.
In Appendix A we solve these proﬁt-maximizing problems and establish the following Lemma.
Lemma 2.1. In the goods-market equilibrium, the earnings of a ﬁrm that can be distributed to
its lenders and shareholders are rL for a low-quality ﬁrm and rH for a high-quality ﬁrm, where
rL ≡ π(i)c(i) − lL = kL, (2.2)
rH ≡ π(i)c(i) − lH =( 1− β)Y + βkL. (2.3)
A ni m p o r t a n tr e s u l th e r ei st h a tah i g h - q u a l i t yﬁrm’s earnings are an increasing function of
the aggregate product demand, Y , while a low-quality ﬁrm’s earnings are determined entirely by
the capital cost kL. Thus, an expected high industry’s publicity widens the diﬀerence in expected
earnings between a high-quality and low-quality ﬁrm. To express this feature formally, denote the
expected earnings of a low-quality ﬁrm by R0 and RH of a high-quality ﬁrm, conditional on IPO
activities. Let D be the amount with which a representative high-quality ﬁrm underprices its
8This can be delivered by the following structure. Suppose that traditional goods are produced using only
labor and the production technology is linear in labor input, normalized to l. Then, net proﬁto faﬁrm in such a
traditional sector is l − wl =( 1− w)l,w h e r ew is the wage rate. Perfect competition in this sector yields w =1 .
9IPO. Because a low-quality ﬁrm does not underprice its IPO, as shown later, the average amount
of underpricing in the industry is Da = αD. (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) then imply
R0 ≡ E(rL|D)=kL (≥ k0 > 1), RH ≡ E(rH|D)=R0xH + ρD, (2.4)
where ρ ≡ (1 − β)αρa > 0a n dxH ≡ β +( 1− β)Y0/kL. Thus, a high-quality ﬁrm’s expected
earnings indeed respond more positively to the industry’s publicity D.
To separate the terms in expected earnings that are unrelated to the industry’s publicity, we
call R0 the intrinsic earnings of a low-quality ﬁrm and R0xH of a high-quality ﬁrm. With this
terminology, we simply refer to x as a ﬁrm’s quality, where x = xH for a high-quality ﬁrm and
x =1f o ral o w - q u a l i t yﬁrm. Assume Y0 >k L,s ot h a txH > 1. Also, assume ρ < 1.
2.3. Initial Public Oﬀering
Let us analyze the IPO decision of an individual ﬁrm. Because the ﬁrm takes the industry’s
publicity D as given, it takes expected earnings (R0,R H) as given. Express the ﬁrm’s IPO
decision as a ≡ (f,q), rather than (f,s). Let I ∈ [0,1] be the posterior belief (probability) in the
market that the ﬁrm is of high-quality, conditional on all ﬁrms’ IPO activities. Then the market
expects the ﬁrm’s earnings to be:
RI ≡ E(r|I)=RHI + R0(1 − I). (2.5)
The expected return to the original owners is as follows:9









The ﬁrm chooses a to maximize V . Note that the ﬁrm knows its own quality x.
Investors do not know the ﬁrm’s quality at the time of IPO, and so they are concerned with
the expected rate of return to shares. In equilibrium, this rate of return must be equal to the
risk-free rate of return. To simply algebra, we normalize the gross, risk-free rate of return to 1.
9Throughout this paper the payoﬀ to a ﬁrm refers to the payoﬀ to the original owners of the ﬁrm after IPO,
rather than the payoﬀ to all shareholders.
10Then, the market price of IPO shares must be equal to the expected return per share. Let pI be
the market price of a share when the posterior belief about the ﬁrm is I. Then,




(1 − q), (2.7)
where EIx−1 ≡ x−1
H I +(1−I). For investors to participate in IPO, the oﬀer price cannot exceed
the market price. That is,
0 ≤ s = q/f ≤ pI. (2.8)
Ah i g h - q u a l i t yﬁrm may want to signal its quality by refraining from a high IPO revenue,
through underpricing and/or issuing fewer shares in IPO. Because a low-quality ﬁrm may mimic,
for successful separation a high-quality ﬁrm must have greater incentive to signal than a low-
quality ﬁrm. The well-known single-crossing property is then necessary (see Fudenberg and

















The ﬁrst condition states that, for a ﬁxed number of shares issued in IPO, a high-quality ﬁrm is
willing to reduce the IPO revenue by more than does a low-quality ﬁrm in order to receive an
increase in the expectations on earnings “rewarded” by the market. The second condition states
that, for a ﬁxed IPO revenue, a high-quality ﬁrm increases the number of shares issued in IPO
by less than does a low-quality ﬁrm in the event of an increased expected earnings.
Assumption 1. 1A. A high-quality ﬁrm, if its quality is publicly known, can make a positive
return even when all external capital comes from alternative funds, i.e., R0xH > 1+b/xH.
1B.Al o w - q u a l i t yﬁrm, if its quality is publicly known, cannot make a positive return when all
external capital comes from alternative funds, i.e., R0 < 1+b.
1C. The intrinsic earning diﬀerence between high-quality and low-quality ﬁrms is not too large,
i.e., R0(xH − 1) <b .
Assumption 1A gives a high-quality ﬁrm some ability to signal its quality: Since it makes
a positive return even with 100% non-equity funds, it can reduce the IPO revenue to signal its
11high quality. But the signalling attempt may or may not require underpricing. Assumption 1B
makes it desirable for a low-quality ﬁrm to ﬁnance its investment through equity if its quality is
publicly known. Since the quality is not publicly known, however, a low-quality ﬁrm may try to
use non-equity ﬁnancing to mimic a high-quality ﬁrm.
Assumption 1C highlights a diﬀerence between our model and previous signalling models
of IPOs (e.g., Allen and Faulhaber 1989, Welch 1989, and Grinblatt and Hwang 1989). This
deliberate assumption ensures that underpricing does not occur in these models (see Section 4).
The assumption also seems realistic for Internet ﬁrms, because the intrinsic diﬀerence between
those ﬁrms does not seem large at the beginning.
2.4. The Case of Public Information
Let us ﬁr s ta n a l y z et h eI P Od e c i s i o ni nt h ec a s ew h e r et h eﬁrm’s quality is public information.
This analysis not only provides a baseline with which we can compare the results in the case of
asymmetric information, it also establishes our earlier claim that the assumption (2.1) itself does
not generate the clustering of underpriced IPOs.
When a ﬁrm is known to be of low-quality, the best choice in the equity market is to obtain
all external capital by issuing shares at the full price. With this strategy, q =1 ,f =1 /R0,a n d
the payoﬀ to the ﬁrm is (R0 −1) > 0. If this ﬁrm chooses q<1, instead, the market price of the
ﬁrm’s share is pL = R0 − (1 + b)(1− q). Since f ≥ q/pL, the payoﬀ to the ﬁrm satisﬁes
V (f,q;R0,x L) ≤ (1 − q/pL)[R0 − (1 + b)(1− q)]
= R0 − (1 + b)(1− q) − q.
The last expression is maximized at q = 1 and so the payoﬀ is less than (R0 − 1) if 0 <q<1.
The payoﬀ is also less than (R0 − 1) if the ﬁrm underprices its IPO, which results in f>q / p L
and hence strict inequality in the above expression.
Similarly, if a ﬁrm is known to be of high-quality, the best choice is to obtain all external
capital by issuing shares at the full price and free-ride on the industry’s publicity. Therefore, we
have the following proposition:
12Proposition 2.2. If qualities are public information, no ﬁrm underprices IPO in equilibrium,
despite the inﬂuence of the industry’s publicity on individual ﬁrms’ expected earnings.
3. Signalling Equilibrium
In this section we characterize a ﬁrm’s strategy under private information, taking the industry’s
publicity D (and hence RH) as given. We refer to this best response of a single ﬁrm, together with
the market belief, as a signalling equilibrium. Of course, D and RH must also be determined in a
market equilibrium, which analysis will be delayed to the next section. For given RH,aB a y e s i a n
signalling equilibrium consists of market beliefs I and the ﬁrm’s decisions (f,q)t h a ts a t i s f yt h e
following conditions: (i) Given the beliefs, the ﬁrm’s decisions maximize the payoﬀ V (f,q;RI,x);
and (ii) With the ﬁrm’s choices, the beliefs are rational according to Bayes updating.
As is well known, there is a large set of such equilibria, because the beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium
path are arbitrary. For example, consider a pooling action a0 ≡ (f0,q 0). Since the market does
not gain any new information about a ﬁrm’s quality from observing this pooling action, the
market’s belief after observing a0 i st h es a m ea st h ep r i o r ,i . e . ,I = α.D e n o t e a ﬁrm’s payoﬀ
from the pooling action as V 0(x) ≡ V (f0,q 0;Rα,x), where x is the ﬁrm’s quality (recall xL =1 ) .
Suppose that the action and the belief satisfy the following conditions:
f0,q 0 ∈ [0,1]; (3.1)




(1 − q0); (3.2)
V 0(1) ≥ R0 − 1. (3.3)
The action a0 satisfying the above conditions is a Bayesian signalling equilibrium, supported by
the belief that any deviation from this action is made by a low-quality ﬁrm.10 Condition (3.1) is
self-explanatory and (3.2) requires the oﬀer price to be at most the market price. Condition (3.3)
10To see this, suppose that a high-quality ﬁrm deviates from a0. Then, according to the particular belief, this
ﬁrm will be perceived as a low-quality ﬁr m .I nt h i sc a s e ,t h eb e s ta c t i o ni s( q,f)=( 1 ,1/R0), which generates a
lower payoﬀ than the pooling action a0 under (3.3).
13requires a low-quality ﬁrm’s payoﬀ in the pooling equilibrium to be at least that from revealing
the ﬁrm’s type, in which case the best actions are (q,f)=( 1 ,1/R0)a n dt h ep a y o ﬀ is R0 − 1.
We use the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) to reﬁne the equilibrium set, and so
the term “equilibrium” in this paper stands for an equilibrium that satisﬁes this criterion. The
Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion is a restriction on the beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path. To describe
this restriction in our model, consider a deviation (f,q) 6=( f0,q 0)t h a ts a t i s ﬁes the following
conditions. First, the deviation is feasible for a high-quality ﬁrm, i.e., f,q ∈ [0,1] and the oﬀer
price does not exceed the implied market price:
0 ≤ q/f ≤ pH = RH − (1 + bx−1
H )(1 − q). (3.4)
Second, if a low-quality ﬁrm makes the same deviation, it gets less than in the pooling equilibrium
even when it is viewed as a high-quality ﬁrm:
(1 − f)[RH − (1 + b)(1 − q)] <V0(1). (3.5)
Third, the deviation generates a higher payoﬀ to the high-quality ﬁrm than in the pooling equi-
librium if the ﬁrm is viewed as a high-quality ﬁrm as a result of the deviation:
(1 − f)
h
RH − (1 + bx−1
H )(1 − q)
i
>V0(xH). (3.6)
Actions that satisfy (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6) are “credible” deviations by a high-quality ﬁrm. A
low-quality ﬁrm will not take make such deviations even when it is given the beneﬁt of doubt and
viewed as a high-quality ﬁrm. In contrast, a high-quality ﬁrm gains by such deviations, if the
market views the deviator as a high-quality ﬁrm. Observing these deviations, the market should
intuitively interpret the deviator as a high-quality ﬁrm, as argued by Cho and Kreps (1987).
To see how this restriction helps reﬁning the equilibrium set, let us ﬁrst rewrite (3.4) and
(3.5). Under Assumption 1A, (3.4) can be rewritten as f,q ∈ [0,1] and
f ≥ SH(q) ≡ q
.h
RH − (1 + bx−1
H )(1 − q)
i
. (3.7)
14To rewrite (3.5), deﬁne a critical level:
Q1 ≡ 1 −
RH − V 0(1)
1+b
. (3.8)
Since V 0(1) ≤ Rα−1 (see Appendix B), Q1 < 1. If either Q1 < 0o rq ≤ Q1 then (3.5) is satisﬁed
for all f ∈ [0,1]. For q ≥ max{0,Q 1}, (3.5) can be rewritten as
f>I N D L(q) ≡ 1 − V 0(1)/[RH − (1 + b)(1 − q)] . (3.9)
Similar to (3.7), (3.2) can be rewritten as follows:









Figures 1a and 1b depict the curves f = SH(q), f = INDL(q)a n df = Sα(q)f o rt h et w o
cases Q1 < 0a n dQ1 > 0, respectively. The curve f = SH(q) is the full-price curve for a high-
quality ﬁrm, above which underpricing occurs; Similarly, the curve f = Sα(q)i st h ef u l l - p r i c e
curve in a pooling action. The curve f = INDL(q) is the set of actions to which a deviation
by a low-quality ﬁrm generates the same payoﬀ as the pooling action (f0,q 0) when the ﬁrm is
viewed as a high-quality ﬁrm after the deviation. Actions above the curve f = INDL(q) generate
strictly lower payoﬀst oal o w - q u a l i t yﬁrm even if the ﬁrm is viewed as a high-quality ﬁrm after a
deviation to such actions. Thus, the shaded area in each diagram is the set of actions that satisfy
(3.7) and (3.9) (i.e., (3.4) and (3.5)). The Cho-Kreps criterion requires that the market view any
such deviation as coming from a high-quality ﬁrm and attach a belief I = 1 to the deviator.
Figures 1a and 1b here.
A high-quality ﬁrm should consider only deviations that maximize its payoﬀ. For any deviation
in the shaded area that is not the best, a further deviation to the best action does not change the
market’s belief (I = 1) under the Cho-Kreps criterion but improves a high-quality ﬁrm’s payoﬀ.
To ﬁnd the best credible deviation from a pooling action, we need to know the properties of SH(q)
and INDL(q), which are summarized in the following lemma and proved in Appendix B:
15Lemma 3.1. (i) Under Assumptions 1A − 1B, IND0
L(q) > 0 and IND00
L(q) < 0 for all q>Q 1;
S0
H(q) > 0 and S00
H(q) < 0 for all q>0.( i i ) I f Q1 < 0,t h e nINDL(q) >S H(q) for all q ≥ 0;
If Q1 ≥ 0, then there is a unique solution to INDL(q)=SH(q) in the range q ≥ Q1, denoted
QA, such that INDL(q) >S H(q) if and only if q>Q A. (iii) A high-quality ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is an
increasing function of q along f = SH(q) and a decreasing function of q along f = INDL(q).
While (i) and (ii) are mechanical, the property (iii) is important and can be explained as
follows. A high-quality ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is an increasing function of q along the full-price curve
f = SH(q)b e c a u s e ,a st h eﬁrm raises a higher revenue through IPO without underpricing, the
ﬁrm economizes on the cost of alternative funds and so expected proﬁti n c r e a s e s . T oe x p l a i n
why a high-quality ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is a decreasing function of q along f = INDL(q), recall that
ah i g h - q u a l i t yﬁrm’s desire to increase the number of shares issued in IPO is weaker than a
low-quality ﬁrm’s (see (2.9)). As actions move upward along the curve f = INDL(q), the IPO
revenue increases and such actions are increasingly more enticing to a low-quality ﬁrm. To keep
al o w - q u a l i t yﬁrm indiﬀerent between these actions and the pooling action, the number of shares
issued in IPO must increase more sharply than it is desirable to a high-quality ﬁrm.
Lemma 3.1 implies that the best deviation by a high-quality ﬁrm from the supposed pooling
equilibrium is arbitrarily close to and above the action depicted by point A,i nF i g u r e1 a if Q1 < 0
and Figure 1b if Q1 > 0. To see this, note that the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ increases when actions move
southeast in Figures 1a and 1b, and so the best deviations are located arbitrarily close to and
above the lower boundaries of the shaded areas. Moreover, since a high-quality ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is an
increasing function of q along the full-price curve f = SH(q) and a decreasing function of q along
the curve f = INDL(q) (see Lemma 3.1), the best deviation is arbitrarily close to and above










, if Q1 ≤ 0
(SH(QA),Q A), if Q1 > 0.
(3.11)
For a high-quality ﬁrm to deviate to point A, (3.6) must also hold. The following lemma,
proved in Appendix C, describes the necessary and suﬃcient condition for (3.6):
Lemma 3.2. From any pooling action (f0,q 0), a deviation by a high-quality ﬁrm to (fb,q b)
increases the payoﬀ iﬀ (1 − fb)RH > (1 − f0)Rα.
When the deviation (fb,q b) dominates the pooling action under the Cho-Kreps intuitive cri-
terion, there is no pooling equilibrium and so the best action for a low-quality ﬁrm is (f,q)=
(1/R0,1), yielding a payoﬀ R0 − 1. Replacing V 0(1) by R0 − 1, the condition Q1 ≤ 0 becomes
RH ≥ R0+b. Also, denote the corresponding values of (fb,q b)b y( f∗,q∗). Thus, for RH ≥ R0+b,
Figure 1a applies and
f∗ =1− R0−1
RH−(1+b),q ∗ =0 . (3.12)







H )(1−q∗) =1 − R0−1
RH−(1+b)(1−q∗).
(3.13)
We have the following propositions (see Appendix C for a proof):
Proposition 3.3. Under the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion, a separating signalling equilibrium
exists. In this equilibrium, a high-quality ﬁrm takes actions (f∗,q∗), characterized by (3.12) when
RH−R0 ≥ b and by (3.13) when RH−R0 <b . A low-quality ﬁrm takes actions (f,q)=( 1 /R0,1),
which entail no underpricing. For any given RH, this is the only separating equilibrium. If α < α,
where α ∈ (0,1) is deﬁned in appendix C, there is no pooling equilibrium.
11I nt h eb o r d e r l i n ec a s eQ1 =0( w h e r ep o i n tA coincides with the origin of the plane), the best deviation is
f = ε > 0a n dq =0 ,w h e r eε is suﬃciently small. Since this case involves underpricing, it can be grouped with
the case Q1 < 0.
17We focus on the unique separating equilibrium by restricting α < α.12 Ah i g h - q u a l i t yﬁrm
has a preference over the two ways to signal and separate from a low-quality ﬁrm, reducing the
number of issues and underpricing. Although both reduce the IPO revenue, the ﬁrst method is
preferable when the diﬀerence in expected earnings relative to a low-quality ﬁrm is small. By not
underpricing IPO, the original owners can keep a large stake of the ﬁrm and its future earnings. If
they underprice, instead, they give up a larger number of shares to the public and hence a larger
claim on future earnings. Despite this costly nature of underpricing, a high-quality ﬁrm chooses
to underprice IPO because reducing the number of issues alone is not suﬃcient for signalling
successfully when other ﬁrms underprice their IPOs. Even by reducing f to zero the ﬁrm can
only signal a diﬀerential in expected earnings of b.13 For expected earnings higher than this level,
the ﬁrm must sacriﬁce even more in order to prevent a low-quality ﬁrm from mimicking, and this
entails underpricing. When the ﬁrm underprices IPO, the number of underpriced shares increases
with the level of expected revenue that the ﬁrm wants to signal. That is, f increases with RH in
the underpricing region.
The number of shares issued in IPO has a U-shaped relationship with the ﬁrm’s expected
earnings, as depicted in Figure 2. When a high-quality ﬁrm’s expected earnings increase from
low levels, the number of shares issued to the public decreases, while IPO is at the full market
price. This continues until the number of shares issued to the public reaches a minimum, which
is zero in this version of the model. Then the number of IPO shares increases with the expected
earnings (see subsection 5.1 for more discussions).
Figure 2 here.
12Some pooling equilibria survive the Cho-Kreps reﬁnement under certain conditions because the extent to
which a high-quality ﬁr mc a ns i g n a li sl i m i t e db yt h er e q u i r e m e n tt h a tt h eI P Or e v e n u eb en o n - n e g a t i v e .W h e n
the expected earning of a high-quality ﬁrm is suﬃciently higher than that of a low-quality ﬁrm, the high-quality
ﬁrm must incur a suﬃciently high signalling cost in order to prevent a low-quality from mimicking. This becomes
diﬃcult when there is a lower bound (0) on the IPO revenue and so some pooling equilibria with a small IPO
revenue can survive.
13This is obtained by setting (f,q)=( 0 ,0) and V
0(1) = R0 − 1 in the equality form of (3.9).
184. Market Equilibrium and Clustering
A symmetric market equilibrium is a pair (d,D) such that d is the best response of a high-quality
ﬁrm to D, given implicitly by Proposition 3.3, and that d = D.O n c e D is determined, RH is
also determined. We show that there exist multiple, self-fulﬁlling market equilibria. This type
of multiplicity is diﬀerent from the usual multiplicity in signalling games, because the signalling
game here has a unique separating equilibrium for any given RH.
To begin, denote
D0 ≡ [b − R0 (xH − 1)]/ρ. (4.1)
Then D0 > 0( A s s u m p t i o n1 C). Also, RH − R0 ≥ b if and only if D ≥ D0.W ec a nt h e nr e w r i t e





0, if D<D 0
pH = ρD + R0xH − 1 − bx−1
H , if D ≥ D0.
(4.2)
Imposing the equilibrium requirement d = D on (4.2), we can verify the following proposition
(the proof is straightforward and omitted):
Proposition 4.1. Deﬁne ρ ∈ (0,1) as follows:
ρ ≡
b − R0(xH − 1)
b(1 − x−1
H )+R0 − 1
. (4.3)
Under Assumptions 1A − 1C, there is a market equilibrium for all 0 ≤ ρ < 1, where no ﬁrm
underprices IPO. A market equilibrium, where all high-quality ﬁrms underprice IPOs, exists if
and only if ρ ≤ ρ < 1.T h u s ,w h e n0 ≤ ρ < ρ, only the no-underpricing equilibrium exists; when
ρ ≤ ρ < 1, the underpricing equilibrium and the no-underpricing equilibrium co-exist. In the
underpricing equilibrium, the amount of underpricing increases with ρ.
Figure 3 depicts the case ρ < ρ < 1. The underpricing “curve” depicts the best response
(4.2), The no-underpricing equilibrium is at point EN and the underpricing equilibrium is at
point EU. In both equilibria high-quality ﬁrms successfully separate themselves from low-quality
19ﬁrms. They do so in the no-underpricing equilibrium by reducing the number of issues only and,
in the underpricing equilibrium, by underpricing.
Figure 3 here.
The above proposition has several noteworthy aspects. First, when 0 ≤ ρ < ρ, the no-
underpricing equilibrium is the only equilibrium. In this case, the level D0 is large and the
underpricing curve lies below the 45-degree line for all D>0. Thus, no ﬁrm underprices its IPO
if the industry’s publicity has only a weak eﬀect on the industry’s expected product demand.
Similarly, there is no underpricing if there is only one ﬁrm in the industry.14
Second, the no-underpricing equilibrium exists for all ρ ∈ [0,1). Even when the industry’s
publicity has a strong eﬀect on the industry’s expected product demand (i.e., when ρ > ρ), ﬁrms
will not underprice if they expect that other ﬁrms will not underprice. With such expectations,
the diﬀerence in expected earnings between a high-quality and a low-quality ﬁrm is small, as
maintained by Assumption 1C. Then low-quality ﬁrms’ temptation to mimic is weak, in which
case a high-quality ﬁrm can separate itself out by reducing the number of issues alone. The
absence of underpricing in turn supports the low expectations of the industry’s publicity.
Third, the two equilibria both exist when the externality is strong (i.e., when ρ ≤ ρ < 1).
The coexistence is an outcome of self-fulﬁlling expectations. We have already explained why a
ﬁrm will not underprice if it expects that other ﬁrms will not underprice. On the other hand, if a
high-quality ﬁrm expects that other high-quality ﬁrms will underprice, the diﬀerence in expected
earnings between high-quality and low-quality ﬁrms is large, due to the inﬂuence of the industry’s
publicity. A low-quality ﬁrm’s temptation to mimic is strong in this case and so a high-quality ﬁrm
must underprice in order to separate itself from a low-quality ﬁrm. Since all high-quality ﬁrms
underprice IPOs in this case, the clustering of underpriced IPOs in turn fulﬁlls the expectations
that the industry’s publicity is high. The coexistence of the no-underpricing equilibrium with the
14As noted before, Assumption 1C is important for this result. When the intrinsic earning diﬀerence between a
high-quality and a low-quality ﬁrm is large enough to violate Assumption 1C,t h e nρ < 0 and there is a need for a
high-quality ﬁrm to underprice anyway. In fact, only the underpricing equilibrium exists in this case.
20underpricing equilibrium illustrates the fragility of the clustering of underpriced IPOs.
Finally, the model is capable of producing large underpricing. In the underpricing equilibrium,
high-quality ﬁrms oﬀer their shares free of charge! When expected industry’s publicity passes over
the critical level D0,t h eo ﬀer price drops to 0 and the percentage of discount that a high-quality
ﬁrm oﬀers to IPO investors jumps from 0 to 100%.15 The large underpricing resembles those
observed in some Internet IPOs in 1999. Considering that the intrinsic diﬀerence between high-
quality and low-quality ﬁr m si ss m a l l( A s s u m p t i o n1 C), the large magnitude of underpricing
is remarkable. With the same restriction on the earning diﬀerential, there is no underpricing
in previous signalling models. To understand this diﬀerence between our model and previous
models, it is important to note that the market price of shares is endogenous in our model. Small
diﬀerences between ﬁrms’ intrinsic earnings can be magniﬁed by expected industry’s publicity into
large diﬀerences in market prices, leading to large underpricing. In contrast, previous signalling
models assume that the market price of shares is exogenous in equilibrium once the ﬁrm’s type
is known, and so they cannot generate underpricing when the diﬀerence between ﬁrms’ intrinsic
earnings is small.
Despite the obvious role of the industry’s publicity, it is important to recall that the beneﬁt
of the industry’s publicity to high-quality ﬁrms is an externality and hence such beneﬁt reduces,
rather than promotes, underpricing (Proposition 2.2). It is the informational cost generated by
the industry’s publicity that forces high-quality ﬁrms to underprice. As explained above, the
informational cost increases with the industry’s publicity because low-quality ﬁrms’ temptation
to mimic increases with the industry’s publicity, which makes separation more diﬃcult.
Our model explains why underpriced IPOs cluster in particular time and particular industry.
The clustering of underpriced IPOs is a temporary phenomenon in new industries like the Internet
industry, where publicity is likely to yield a large beneﬁt initially. As the industry becomes
15Of course, a zero oﬀer price is unrealistic. In subsection 5.1 we extend the model to generate a positive oﬀer
price in the underpricing equilibrium.
21established, forecasts about earnings are more reliable and less susceptible to the inﬂuence of the
industry’s publicity. Moreover, as the industry matures, competition among ﬁrms in the same
industry becomes more important than against ﬁrms in traditional sectors. In this case one ﬁrm’s
underpricing may hurt rather than beneﬁt other ﬁrms in the same industry, and so IPOs with
large underpricing are less likely to cluster.16
Our model also implies that clustering may vary over business cycles. The frequency and the
magnitude of clustering are likely to be higher in economic expansions than in downturns, and
in an easy credit market than in a tight credit market (other things being equal between the two
markets). To see this, note that the cost of alternative funds, captured by parameter b,i sl i k e l y
to be lower in economic expansions than in downturns, and in an easy credit market than in a
tight credit market. Because a reduction in b reduces the critical level ρ in (4.3), the condition
ρ >ρ required for clustering is more easily satisﬁed. The explanation is as follows. When the
cost of alternative funds is low, it is less costly to underprice IPO, because a ﬁrm can easily ﬁnd
alternative funds to make up for the shortfall in the IPO revenue. As a result, low-quality ﬁrms
are more tempting to mimic high-quality ﬁrms. To separate successfully, a high-quality ﬁrm is
more likely to resort to highly costly actions, such as underpricing IPO. For any given ρ,t h e
amount of underpricing is also higher when b is lower.
5. Extensions and Robustness
In this section we extend the model to illustrate the robustness of the results and improve the
model’s quantitative implications. For example, by imposing a lower bound on equity ﬁnancing,
we show that the oﬀer price can be positive in the underpricing equilibrium.
5.1. A Lower Bound on the IPO Revenue
A ﬁrm may face a constraint on how much non-equity fund it can obtain, and so it may be
forced to obtain a minimum IPO revenue. Let this minimum be Qbs/p,w h e r eQb ∈ (0,1) is a
16This case corresponds to ρ < 0. Since underpricing is the best response to other ﬁrms’ underpricing only if
ρD>b− R0(xH − 1) (see (4.1) and (4.2)), under Assumption 1C there cannot be an underpricing equilibrium
when ρ < 0.
22constant. This speciﬁcation incorporates the idea that alternative ﬁnanciers are more willing to
supply funds to a ﬁrm whose IPO has a larger price gain. Substituting the market price of shares
in a separating equilibrium, we can rewrite the constraint q ≥ Qbs/p for a high-quality ﬁrm as:
f ≥
Qb
RH − (1 + bx−1
H )(1 − q)
≡ LB(q). (5.1)
With this constraint, the separating action depicted by point A in Figures 1a and 1b may no
longer be feasible to a high-quality ﬁrm. A scenario is depicted in Figure 4 for the case Q1 > 0,
in which the best separating action is given by point B. Because point B lies above the full-price
curve f = SH(q), the IPO is underpriced. Such an underpricing equilibrium exists if and only if
the curve f = LB(q) crosses the curve f = INDL(q) before crossing f = SH(q). Equivalently,
this requires INDL(Qb) >S H(Qb), which is satisﬁed when Qb is suﬃciently close to 1.
Figure 4 here.
Two properties of the separating equilibrium here are in contrast with the simple model. First,
an underpricing ﬁrm’s oﬀer price can be positive, as point B in Figure 4 illustrates. Second, the
number of shares issued in IPO does not necessarily increase with earnings in the underpricing
equilibrium. When RH increases in Figure 4, for example, the curve f = INDL(q) shifts up but
the curve f = LB(q) shifts down. These two forces change f in opposite ways, and so the eﬀect
of RH on f is ambiguous analytically. When the externality is suﬃciently strong, however, f is
likely to increase with RH and ﬁrms underprice greatly, as in the simple model.
5.2. A Firm’s Own Inﬂuence on Publicity
A ﬁrm may directly beneﬁt from its underpricing, in addition to the industry’s publicity. To
allow for this beneﬁt, let us return to the simple model and modify
RH = R0xH + ρ(γd + D), (5.2)
where d is the ﬁrm’s own underpricing and γ > 0 is the relative impact of the ﬁrm’s own
underpricing on its expected earnings. The simple case before corresponds to γ =0 .
23Now a ﬁrm cannot take RH as given because its own decision directly aﬀects RH.D e n o t et h e
part that the ﬁr mt a k e sa sg i v e na sW ≡ R0xH+ρD. Using (5.2) to compute RI and substituting





IW +( 1− I)R0 − Iργq/f − (1 + bEIx−1)(1 − q)
i
. (5.3)
Restrict 0 ≤ ρ < 1/γ to ensure pI > 0. The constraint s ≤ pH can be written as
f ≥ q
.h
W − (1 + bx−1
H )(1 − q)
i
. (5.4)
Proposition 5.1. There exist γ1 > 0 and ρ1 ∈ (0,1/(1 + γ)) such that an underpricing equilib-
rium exists if ρ ∈ (ρ1,1/(1 + γ)) and γ ≤ γ1.T h e r ee x i s tγ2 > 0 and ρ2 ∈ (0,1/γ) such that a
no-underpricing market equilibrium exists if 0 ≤ ρ < ρ2 and γ ≤ γ2.M o r e o v e r ,ρ1 < ρ2 and so
the two market equilibria coexist when ρ ∈ (ρ1,ρ2) and γ ≤ min{γ1,γ2}.
The proof of this proposition is omitted (see Cao and Shi 1999 or enclosed Appendix D). This
proposition shows that the qualitative results here are similar to those in the simple model. In
particular, IPO underpricing can cluster when the industry’s publicity has a strong eﬀect on the
industry’s product demand. This may be the case even when γ > 1, i.e., when a ﬁrm beneﬁts
more from its own publicity than from the industry’s publicity.
5.3. Sequential Decisions
In the simple model we have assumed that diﬀerent ﬁr m sg ot ot h eI P Om a r k e ta tt h es a m et i m e .
By this we do not mean that ﬁrms in reality literally make their IPO decisions at the same date
but rather that some ﬁrms’ IPO dates are close to each other so that one ﬁrm cannot change the
IPO decision to take into account of observed actions by other ﬁrms. Although this interpretation
is appealing, one may still want to know what happens if ﬁrms can modify their IPO decisions
upon observing other ﬁrms’ actions. We analyze this sequential game now and show that ﬁrms
still tend to cluster their IPO underpricing decisions.
Consider only two ﬁrms, ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2. Firm 1 goes to the IPO market at date 1 and ﬁrm
2 at date 2. To simplify matters, we assume that both ﬁrms have earnings only at date 2 and
24there is no time discounting. Let di be the amount of underpricing by ﬁrm i =1 ,2. Assume that,
if ﬁrm i is perceived as a high-quality ﬁrm, expected earnings are given by RH in (2.4), with D
being replaced by di0 (i0 6= i). This speciﬁcation keeps the gist of the interaction between ﬁrms
in (2.4) and simpliﬁes the algebra in this two-ﬁrm setup.
Given d1, ﬁrm 2’s pricing decision is analogous to that analyzed in the simple model. That





0, if d1 <D 0
ρd1 + R0xH − 1 − bx−1
H , if d1 ≥ D0,
where D0 is deﬁned in (4.1). Note that ﬁrm 2 responds to ﬁrm 1’s underpricing positively.
Firm 1 anticipates this inﬂuence of its IPO pricing decision on ﬁrm 2’s. Given ﬁrm 1’s prior
on ﬁrm 2’s quality, the expected amount of ﬁrm 2’s IPO underpricing is
αχ(d1>D0)(ρd1 + R0xH − 1 − bx−1
H ),
where χ(d1>D0) =1i fd1 >D 0 and 0 otherwise. Suppose ﬁrm 1 chooses d1 <D 0.T h e nd2 =0
and there is no publicity from which ﬁrm 1 can beneﬁt. In this case ﬁrm 1’s best decision is
d1 = 0 and the payoﬀ to both ﬁrms is identical to that in the no-underpricing equilibrium in the
simple model. This can be a market equilibrium in the current case if and only if the payoﬀ to
ﬁrm 1 is not lower than that generated by the action d1 ≥ D0.
Now suppose ﬁrm 1 chooses d1 ≥ D0. If the market believes that the ﬁrm is of high-quality
with probability I, the expected earning of the ﬁrm is
RI =( 1− I)R0 + I
h




Slightly change the earlier notation to denote W =( 1+ρα)R0xH − ρα(1 + bx−1
H ). The market





IW +( 1− I)R0 − Iαρ2q/f − (1 + bEIx−1)(1 − q)
i
.
This is similar in form to the market price in the last subsection, with αρ2 replacing ργ,a n ds o
ﬁrm 1’s decision on the oﬀer price can be analyzed analogously. To ensure a positive share price,
25we restrict 0 ≤ ρ < α−1/2. The proof of the following proposition is omitted (see Cao and Shi
1999 or enclosed Appendix E):
Proposition 5.2. There exist ρ3,ρ4 ∈ (0,α−1/2) such that ﬁrm 1 underprices IPO if and only if
it is of high-quality and ρ ∈ (ρ3,ρ4).F i r m2 underprices IPO if and only if it is of high-quality
and if ﬁrm 1 underprices IPO.
Example 5.3. Let α =0 .1, b =0 .2, xL =1 , xH =1 .18 and R0 =1 .02. Then, ρ3 =1 .75 < ρ4 =
1.91. Thus, the interval (ρ3,ρ4) can be non-empty.
As the example shows, both ﬁrms underprice IPOs in some cases. More importantly, when ﬁrm
1 underprices IPO, ﬁrm 2 will do so as well if it is of high quality. Since such underpricing would
not occur if there were only one ﬁrm in the industry or if publicity had no eﬀect on the industry’s
expected demand, the result shows that the interaction between ﬁrms through expectations is
important for the clustering of underpriced IPOs, just as in the case of simultaneous decisions.
It is not surprising then that the underpricing equilibrium here also requires the externality to
be strong (i.e., ρ > ρ3).17 In contrast to the case of simultaneous moves, however, too strong an
externality (i.e., ρ > ρ4) will destroy the underpricing equilibrium in the current case. This is
because underpricing is costly and, when the externality is very strong, the amount of underpricing
is too large to be desirable for ﬁrm 1 as the ﬁrst mover in the game.
Multiplicity of equilibria disappears with sequential moves. However, this is an artifact of the
exogenously ﬁxed order of moves by the two ﬁrms. Being a ﬁrst mover is costly in the current
setup, because it must underprice suﬃciently in order to entice the other ﬁrm to underprice. If
ﬁrms can choose when to go to the IPO market, they have incentive to go to the market at dates
that are very close to each other in order to explore the great externality. Then, the multiplicity
analyzed in the simple model would reappear.18
17Firm 1’s underpricing is not always echoed by ﬁrm 2, since ﬁrm 2 may turn out to be a low-quality ﬁrm. This
uncertainty is eliminated in the case of simultaneous moves with the assumption of a large number of ﬁrms. As a
result, the amount of underpricing is larger there than here.
18Tambanis and Bernhardt (1999) explicitly model the possibility that ﬁrms can delay the timing of their equity
issue. However, they do not analyze IPO underpricing.
266. Conclusion
When ﬁrms signal their quality in initial public oﬀerings of shares, an industry-wide uncertainty
in product demand can induce many ﬁrms in the industry to underprice their IPOs at the same
time. This clustering is a self-fulﬁlling phenomenon, which arises because the uncertainty makes
expectations of the industry’s product demand susceptible to the industry’s publicity created
by IPO performances. When other ﬁrms are expected to underprice, the industry’s publicity
is great and low-quality ﬁrms’ temptation to mimic is strong, in which case a high-quality ﬁrm
must underprice in order to separate itself out. When other ﬁrms are expected to not underprice,
however, the industry’s publicity is low and low-quality ﬁrms’ temptation to mimic is weak, in
which case a high-quality ﬁrm can signal its quality successfully by reducing the number of shares
in IPO instead of underpricing.
Three aspects of the model are important for the clustering. The ﬁrst is private information.
If a ﬁrm’s quality is public information, instead, the ﬁrm will free-ride on the industry’s publicity,
which eliminates underpricing altogether. The second is the feature that expected earnings of
ah i g h - q u a l i t yﬁrm respond more positively to product demand in the industry than those of
al o w - q u a l i t yﬁrm. This result we derive endogenously in a quality-ladder setup. The third is
expectations. Whenever there is an underpricing equilibrium, there is also another equilibrium
without underpricing. Thus, the clustering is not inevitable. No matter how strongly the indus-
try’s publicity aﬀects expected product demand in the industry, it is optimal for a ﬁrm not to
underprice IPO if it expects that other ﬁrms will not underprice.
Our emphasis on the clustering is a marked shift from the literature’s emphasis on a single
ﬁrm’s underpricing. The analysis explains three features of a hot-issue market, especially the
Internet craze in 1999. First, the clustering of large IPO underpricing is an industry-wide phe-
nomenon. It occurs more often in industries that are uncertain in product demand, susceptible
to the inﬂuence of publicity, and with severe private information regarding ﬁrms’ qualities. As
the industry matures, the clustering will become rare because forecasts about earnings become
27reliable and less susceptible to the inﬂuence of the industry’s publicity. Second, the clustering of
underpriced IPOs is fragile and short-lived. Even adverse news about a single ﬁrm can greatly
aﬀect all IPO performances in that industry, by inducing investors to switch the expectations
from the underpricing equilibrium to the no-underpricing equilibrium.19 In light of these two
features, both the “hot-issue” market in Internet IPOs in 1999 and the subsequent cooling-oﬀ are
outcomes of rational expectations about the new industry’s performance. Finally, underpriced
IPOs are more likely to cluster when the marginal cost of alternative funds is low, and so a large
number of price gains in new shares occur more often in economic upturns than in downturns,
and in an easy credit market than in a tight market. Thus, if the monetary authority wants to
reduce the exuberance in the IPO market, it can do so by a tight monetary policy that reduces
the loanable funds in the market.
19An example is the Biotech industry that experienced large underpricing in IPOs at the beginning of the 1990s.
The heat over biotech stocks cooled down considerably when the Food and Drug Administration rejected several
promising drugs such as Centocor Inc.’s Centoxin, a medicine meant to ﬁght a deadly bacteria infection common
in surgery patients.
28Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 2.1
Consider ﬁrst a ﬁrm that produces a low-quality variety i ∈ [α,1]. Substituting lL = c(i)/(βc0)
and c(i)=Y/π(i), we can rewrite this ﬁrm’s net proﬁta sY − Y/[βc0π(i)] − kL. Because
competition drives net proﬁtt o0f o rt h i sﬁrm, the price of a low-quality variety is
π(i)=π∗ ≡
1
βc0 (1 − kL/Y)
.
With c(i)=Y/π(i)a n dlL = c(i)/(βc0), we obtain c(i)=βc0(Y − kL)a n dlL = Y − kL.T h e
earnings (after subtracting the labor cost), rL,i se q u a lt okL, as stated in (2.2).
Now consider a ﬁrm that produces a high-quality variety i ∈ [0,α). Although a high-quality
ﬁrm is the only producer for the speciﬁcv a r i e t y ,t h eﬁrm must set price to prevent low-quality
imitators from entering. If a ﬁrm enters and produces i with low-quality, the price of the good
that this low-quality imitator will set is π∗, determined above. To prevent entry by low-quality
imitators, a high-quality produce can set price at π(i)=π∗−ε,w h e r eε > 0, which yields negative
proﬁt to an imitator. This pricing strategy succeeds for any ε > 0 and the optimal strategy is to
set ε arbitrarily close to 0. Thus, in the limit, a high-quality variety’s price is also π∗.
With the price π∗, a high-quality producer’s labor input is lH = c(i)/c0 = Y/(c0π∗)=
β(Y − kL). Substituting this result into the deﬁnition of earnings rH, it becomes clear that rH
=( 1− β)Y + βkL, as in (2.3). QED
B. Proof of Lemma 3.1
We establish the following lemma ﬁrst:
Lemma B.1. V 0(xH),V0(1) ≤ Rα − 1.
29Proof. To prove this lemma, we rewrite (3.1) and (3.2). Since q0/f0 ≤ pα,t h er e s t r i c t i o n
f0 ∈ [0,1] is equivalent to pα ≥ q0 ≥ 0. With the price expression in (3.2), (3.1) becomes:







Since Rα >R 0 > 1, Q0 < 1. With q0 ≥ Q0, (3.2) can be replaced by (3.10). Then, we have:
















































(1 − q0) − q0 ≤ Rα − 1.
The ﬁrst inequality follows from substituting the lower bound on f0 in (3.10); the second inequality
follows because the preceding expression is increasing in x; and the last inequality follows because
the preceding expression is increasing in q0. Similarly, V 0(1) ≤ Rα − 1. QED
For Lemma 3.1, we can verify the monotone and concavity features of SH(q)a n dINDL(q)
directly. To prove the other properties in the lemma, note that
SH(1) = 1/RH < 1/Rα < 1 − (Rα − 1)/RH < 1 − V 0(1)/RH = INDL(1).
The third inequality follows from Lemma B.1.
Consider ﬁrst the case Q1 < 0( s e eF i g u r e1 a). In this case the relevant range of q is q ∈ [0,1].
Since Q1 < 0, we have
SH(0) = 0 < 1 − V 0(1)/(RH − 1 − b)=INDL(0).
Because SH(1) <I N D L(1), as shown above, INDL(q) >S H(q)f o rb o t hq =0a n d1 .T os h o w
SH(q) <IND L(q) for all q ∈ [0,1], it suﬃces to show that INDL(q) crosses SH(q)f r o mb e l o wi f
they ever cross each other in the positive quadrant. To show this crossing property, suppose that
the two curves cross each other at qc ∈ [0,1], i.e.,
1 − V 0(1)/[RH − (1 + b)(1 − qc)] = qc
.h
RH − (1 + bx−1
H )(1 − qc)
i
. (B.2)
30Computing the derivatives IND0
L(q)a n dS0
H(q) and substituting V 0(1) from (B.2), we can show
that [IND0
L(qc) − S0
H(qc)] has the same sign as the following expression:
[RH − (1 + b)(1 − qc)]qcbx−1
H +
h
RH − (1 + bx−1






RH − (1 + bx−1
H )(1 − qc)
i
− [RH − (1 + b)(1 − qc)])
o
.
The expression in {.} is clearly positive. Also, Assumption 1A implies
RH − (1 + bx−1
H )(1 − qc) − qc >R H − (1 + bx−1
H ) > 0.
Since Q1 < 0, then RH − (1 + b)(1 − qc) >V0(1) > 0. So, IND0
L(qc) >S 0
H(qc), as desired.
Consider now the case Q1 > 0. Since INDL(q) < 0a n dSH(q) > 0i f0≤ q<Q 1,t h et w o
curves cannot cross each other in this range. Thus, consider only the range q ≥ Q1. In this range
the above proof for the crossing property between INDL(q)a n dSH(q) goes through. Moreover,
INDL(Q1)=0<S H(Q1). Therefore, there is a unique crossing between the two curves.
Along f = INDL(q), a high-quality ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is
[1 − INDL(q)][RH − (1 + bx−1
H )(1 − q)] = V 0(1) ·
RH − (1 + bx−1
H )(1 − q)
RH − (1 + b)(1 − q)
,
which is a decreasing function of q.A l o n gf = SH(q), a high-quality ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is
[1 − SH(q)]
h
RH − (1 + bx−1
H )(1 − q)
i
= RH − (1 + bx−1
H )(1 − q) − q,
which is an increasing function of q.Q E D
C. Proofs of Lemma 3.2 and Proposition 3.3
We prove Lemma 3.2 ﬁrst. When out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfy the Cho-Kreps criterion, the




RH − (1 + bx−1
H )(1 − qb)
i
− V 0(xH)
=( 1 − fb)
h
RH − (1 + bx−1
H )(1 − qb)
i
− (1 − fb)[RH − (1 + b)(1 − qb)]
+
©




V 0(1) − V 0(xH)
¤
= b(1 − x−1
H )(1 − fb)(1 − qb) − b(1 − x−1





1+b [(1 − fb)RH − (1 − f0)Rα].
31The ﬁrst equality follows from adding and subtracting the same terms; the second equality follows
from the fact that the term in {.} is zero by the deﬁnitions of (fb,q b); the third equality follows
from substituting the deﬁnitions of qb and q0. Then Lemma 3.2 is evident.
For Proposition 3.3, we locate the position of a pooling action (f0,q 0). Since a pooling action
must satisfy (3.10), it must lie on or above the curve f = Sα(q). Also, we can verify that
INDL(q0) >f 0 and so the point (f0,q 0) must lie below the curve f = IND(q). This implies
f0 >f b in the case Q1 > 0( s e eF i g u r e1 b).
Consider ﬁrst the case Q1 > 0( F i g u r e1 b). Since fb <f 0 in this case and RH >R α, the gain
t oah i g h - q u a l i t yﬁrm from the deviation to (fb,q b) is strictly positive. Thus there cannot be a
pooling equilibrium in this case. The only equilibrium is a separating equilibrium (f∗,q∗)d e ﬁned
by (3.13). The condition corresponding to this case, Q1 > 0, becomes RH − R0 <b .
Now consider the case Q1 ≤ 0, where the separating actions are given by (3.12). Since
(1 − fb)RH − (1 − f0)Rα =
V 0(1)
RH−(1+b)RH − (1 − f0)Rα
=
1−f0
RH−(1+b) [Rα − RH(1 − q0)],
the gain to a high-quality ﬁrm from deviating from the pooling action to (fb,q b) is strictly positive
if and only if q0 > 1−Rα/RH.T h u s ,( f∗,q∗) form a unique separating equilibrium against pooling
actions with q0 suﬃciently close to 1. In this case the corresponding condition (Q1 ≤ 0) becomes
RH − R0 ≥ b.
The equilibrium established above is unique in the class of separating equilibria. To show that
it is unique among all equilibria, we need to rule out pooling equilibria. A pooling action satisﬁes
the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion if and only if (3.3), (B.1), (3.10), Q1 ≤ 0a n dq0 ≤ 1−Rα/RH are
all satisﬁed. From the deﬁnition of Q0 in (B.1), we have Q0 ≤ 0 if and only if Rα−1−bEαx−1 ≥ 0,
i.e., iﬀ
α ≥ α0 ≡
1+b
RH + b(1 − x−1
H )
.
Note that α0 ∈ (0,1) under Assumption 1A. Suppose that α ≥ α0 and so Q0 ≤ 0, in which case
all q0 ∈ (0,1 −Rα/RH] satisfy (B.1). For any such q0,l e tf0 solve (3.10) as an equality and note




Rα − (1 + bEαx−1)(1 − q0)
¸
[Rα − (1 + b)(1 − q0)].
Both terms of the product are increasing functions of q0 (for q0 > 0 >Q 0). Thus the payoﬀ is
maximized by setting q0 =1−R0/RH. For a pooling equilibrium to exist, this maximum pooling
payoﬀ must satisfy (3.3) with strict inequality. After substituting Rα = R0 + α(RH − R0)a n d
Eαx−1 =1−α(1−x−1




RH − 1 − b + bα(1 − x−1
H )
+
RH − R0(1 + b)
(RH − R0)(RH − 1 − b)
> 0.
The left-hand side of the above inequality is an increasing function of α.W h e nα =0 ,i t sv a l u e
is negative. When α = 1, its value has the same sign as
(RH − R0)(RH − 1 − b)+RH − R0(1 + b).
This is positive, since RH ≥ R0 + b (as Q1 ≤ 0) and the above expression has a value 0 when
RH = R0 + b.T h e r e f o r et h e r ee x i s t sα ∈ (0,1) such that (3.3) is satisﬁed with strict inequality
for the above described (f0,q 0)i fα > α.I f α < α, no pooling action satisﬁes the Cho-Kreps
criterion, in which case the separating equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. QED.
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D .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . 1
Let V 0
L be the payoﬀ to a low-quality from a pooling action (f0,q 0). As in the simple model,
we ﬁnd separating actions that generate lower payoﬀst oal o w - q u a l i t yﬁrm than in a pooling
equilibrium. Then we choose the best among these actions as a candidate for the action of a
high-quality ﬁrm in a separating equilibrium. If a low-quality ﬁrm deviates from the pooling
action to an action (f,q) and is perceived as a high-quality ﬁrm, the payoﬀ is
(1 − f)[W + ργ(pH − s) − (1 + b)(1 − q)] =
1 − f
1 − ργ
[W − ργq/f − (1 + z)(1 − q)],
where W = R0xH +ρD and z = ργb/xH +(1−ργ)b.T h i sp a y o ﬀ is less than that in the pooling




1+z−ργ/f , for f>
ργ
1+z;
q>G (f), for f<
ργ
1+z.
Figures 5a and 5b here.
Let us divide the proof into two cases.
Case 1: W>(1 + z)[1 + (1 − ργ)V 0
L/(1 + z − ργ)]. This case is depicted in Figure 5a.L e t
SH(q) now denote the right-hand side of (5.4) and let its inverse be S−1
H .I tc a nb es h o w nt h a t
there exists γ1 > 0 such that G(f) >S −1
H (f)i nt h er e g i o nf<ργ/(1 + z)i fγ ≤ γ1, as depicted
in Figure 5a. Restrict attention to γ ≤ γ1. In this case the relevant region is f>ργ/(1 + z)a n d
the shaded area is the set of actions that yield lower payoﬀ t oal o w - q u a l i t yﬁrm but may yield
higher payoﬀ to a high-quality ﬁrm than in the pooling equilibrium. We can verify the following
properties for the segment of G(f)w i t hf>ργ/(1 + z):
1(1a) G(f) > 0i ﬀ f>1 − (1 − ργ)V 0
L/(W − 1 − z)( i . e . ,i ﬀ f is higher than point A).
(1b) G0(f) > 0 for all f>1 − (1 − ργ)V 0
L/(W − 1 − z).
(1c) The payoﬀ to a high-quality ﬁrm from taking actions along q = G(f) is decreasing in f.
These properties imply that, if γ ≤ γ1, the best deviation for a high-quality ﬁrm from a
pooling equilibrium is point A in Figure 5a.I nt h i sc a s e ,q = s = 0 and there is underpricing as
in the corresponding case in the simple model.
Case 2: W<(1 + z)[1 + (1 − ργ)V 0
L/(1 + z − ργ)]. In this case, the best deviations for a
high-quality ﬁrm in the region f<ργ/(1 + z)l i eo nt h ec u r v ef = SH(q) and, by property (2c)
below, they are strictly dominated by the action at point A in Figure 5b. Thus, it suﬃces to
consider only the region f>ργ/(1 + z). The curve q = G(f)f o rf>ργ/(1 + z) is depicted
by Figure 5b, where the shaded area is the set of deviations that are feasible to a ﬁrm (when
perceived as a high-quality ﬁrm as a result of deviation) and that generate lower payoﬀst oa
low-quality ﬁrm than in the pooling equilibrium. A lengthy exercise can establish the following
properties, some of which are depicted in Figure 5b:
(2a) There exists a level fc ∈ (ργ/(1 + z),1) such that the curve q = G(f) is decreasing in f for
f ∈ (ργ/(1 + z),f c) and increasing in f for f ∈ (fc,1).
(2b) SH(1) = 1/W > ργ/(1 + z)a n dG(1/W) < 1. That is, the intersection between the curve
f = SH(q)a n dq = 1 lies in the region q>G (f)a n df>ργ/(1 + z). Since the curve f = SH(q)
starts outside this region when q is small, there is at least one intersection between f = SH(q)
and q = G(f), as depicted by point A in Figure 5b.
(2c) A high-quality ﬁrm’s payoﬀ from actions along the curve f = SH(q)i n c r e a s e si nq.
(2d) A high-quality ﬁrm’s payoﬀ from actions along the curve q = G(f)( f o rf>ργ/(1 + z))
decreases in f for all f ≥ (ργ/W)1/2.
(2e) There exists γ2 > 0 such that, if γ ≤ γ2, the intersection (point A)h a sf ≥ (ργ/W)1/2.
These properties imply that, if γ ≤ γ2, the payoﬀ t oah i g h - q u a l i t yﬁrm from deviating from
the pooling action is maximized at the intersection between the curve f = SH(q)a n dq = G(f),
2such as point A in Figure 5b. There is no underpricing in this case.
When α is suﬃciently small, in both case 1 and case 2 one can also show that the payoﬀ
at point A to a high-quality ﬁrm is higher than the payoﬀ in the pooling equilibrium, provided
that the market views such deviation as coming from a high-quality ﬁrm. Thus, the action given
by point A is the separating equilibrium that satisﬁes the Cho-Kreps criterion. Substituting
W = R0xH + ρD and noting that the payoﬀ to a low-quality ﬁrm is R0 − 1 in the absence of
pooling (thus V 0
L in the above analysis is replaced by R0 − 1), we have,
d = pH = 1
1−ργ [ρD + R0xH − 1 − b/xH],








d =0 i fR0xH + ρD<(1 + z)
·
1+




To solve for market equilibria, impose symmetry d = D. Doing so for case 1 we get:
d = D =
R0xH − 1 − b/xH
1 − ρ(1 + γ)
.
Thus, d>0o n l yi fρ < 1/(1 + γ). Also, (D.1) must be satisﬁed in order to have D>0, i.e.,
R0xH + ρ
R0xH − 1 − b/xH
1 − ρ(1 + γ)
> (1 + z)
·
1+




Note that z and (1−ργ)/(1+z −ργ) are decreasing functions of ρ and so is the right-hand side
of the above inequality. The left-hand side is an increasing function of ρ. Since the inequality is
satisﬁed for ρ =1 /(1 + γ)a n dv i o l a t e df o rρ → 0, there exists a critical level ρ1 ∈ (0,1/(1 + γ))
such that the above inequality is satisﬁed if and only if ρ > ρ1. Therefore, an underpricing
equilibrium exists if ρ1 < ρ < 1/(1 + γ)a n dγ ≤ γ1.
For the no-underpricing equilibrium, impose d = D = 0 in case 2. The equilibrium exists if
R0xH < (1 + z)
·
1+
(1 − ργ)(R0 − 1)
1+z − ργ
¸
.( D . 4 )
The right-hand side of this inequality is a decreasing function of ρ. The inequality is satisﬁed
when ρ → 0 and violated when ρ → 1/γ. Thus, there exists ρ2 ∈ (0,1/γ) such that the inequality
is satisﬁed for 0 < ρ < ρ2.I fγ ≤ γ2, in addition, the no-underpricing equilibrium exists.
3Comparing (D.3) and (D.4) we can immediately show ρ1 < ρ2. Therefore, the underpricing
equilibrium and the no-underpricing equilibrium coexist if ρ ∈ (ρ1,ρ2)a n dγ ≤ min{γ1,γ2}.T h i s
completes the proof of Proposition 5.1. QED
E. Proof of Proposition 5.2
We have already argued in the text that ﬁrm 2 underprices only if ﬁrm 1 underprices suﬃciently
(i.e., if d1 ≥ D0). Analogous to the derivation of (D.1) in Appendix D, we have:
d1 =
1
1 − αρ2(W − 1 − b/xH), (E.1)
if W>(1 + αρ2bx−1
H +( 1− αρ2)b)
"
1+
(1 − αρ2)(R0 − 1)
1+αρ2bx−1
H +( 1− αρ2)b − αρ2
#
, (E.2)
where W =( 1+ρα)R0xH −ρα(1+bx−1
H ). The underpricing equilibrium has q = G(f)=0 .W i t h
V 0
L being set to R0 − 1, G(f)=0i m p l i e s :
f =1−




H +( 1− αρ2)b
i. (E.3)
For ﬁrm 1 to underprice, d2 must also be positive and so we need d1 ≥ D0,i . e .
W − 1 − b/xH ≥
1 − αρ2
ρ
[b − R0 (xH − 1)]. (E.4)
Note that W increases in ρ and the right-hand side of (E.2) decreases in ρ. Moreover, (E.2)
is satisﬁed when ρ → α−1/2 and is violated when ρ → 0. Then, there exists ρa ∈ (0,α−1/2)s u c h
that (E.2) is satisﬁed if and only if ρ ∈ (ρa,α−1/2). Similarly, there exists ρb ∈ (0,α−1/2)s u c h
that (E.4) is satisﬁed if and only if ρ ∈ [ρb,α−1/2). Let ρ3 =m a x {ρa,ρb}. Then both (E.2) and
(E.4) are satisﬁed if and only if ρ ∈ (ρ3,α−1/2).
In addition to the requirement ρ ∈ (ρ3,α−1/2), the payoﬀ to ﬁrm 1 (when it is high-quality)
must be higher with d1 > 0t h a nw i t hd1 = 0 in order for the ﬁrm to underprice. With d1 =0 ,















(1 − q∗) − q∗
=( R0 − 1)[R0xH − (1 + b/xH)(1 − q∗)]/[R0xH − (1 + b)(1 − q∗)]
4where the inequalities come from substituting the deﬁnitions of (f∗,q∗) in (3.13). When d1 > 0i n
(E.1), q =0a n df is given by (E.3). The total return to shareholders is (W −1−bx−1
H )/(1−αρ2)
and the payoﬀ to high-quality ﬁrm 1 from underpricing is





H +( 1− αρ2)b
i.
Substituting W and simplifying, we can show that the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is higher with underpricing




(1 − q∗)(R0xH − 1 − b/xH)
R0xH − (1 + b/xH)(1 − q∗)
.
There exists ρ4 ∈ (0,α−1/2) such that the above condition is satisﬁed if and only if 0 ≤ ρ < ρ4.
The level ρ4 is not necessarily greater than ρ3. Only when ρ4 > ρ3 and ρ ∈ (ρ3,ρ4)d o e sh i g h -
quality ﬁrm 1 underprice IPO. QED
5Figure 5a When a high-quality ﬁrm has its own inﬂuence
on publicity: Case 1 (large W)
Figure 5b When a high-quality ﬁrm has its own inﬂuence
on publicity: Case 2 (small W)
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